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THE METHODOLOGY USED TO INTERPRET CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE 
 
G Pienaar* 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The South African legal system is based predominantly on a mixture of civil law 
(Roman-Dutch) and English Common Law1 principles.2 Not only South African 
common law principles established and applied by case law, but also legislation 
forms part of this mixture.3 In academic writing Roman-Dutch, European civil law and 
English Common Law jurists are mainly cited as authority for South African common 
law principles, thus firmly establishing the South African legal system as a mixed 
jurisdiction. In this respect Zimmermann observed:4  
 
At the same time, however, English law had started to infiltrate and a process was 
set in motion that ultimately transformed Roman-Dutch law in South Africa into a 
mixed legal system with its own identity: neither purely Roman-Dutch nor purely 
English but an anglicized, specifically South African usus modernus of Roman-
Dutch law. 
 
However, a third component of the mix, namely indigenous or customary law, does 
not always receive the same attention. In this regard the South African Constitution 
of 19965 explicitly states that "the Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any 
                                                          
*  Gerrit Pienaar. B Jur et Com LLB LLD (PU for CHE). Professor in Property Law, North-West 
University (Potchefstroom). Email: gerrit.pienaar@nwu.ac.za. 
1  When referring to the English Common Law, capital letters are used to distinguish the concept 
from South African common law, which is a mixture of civil (Roman-Dutch) and English Common 
Law principles. 
2  Zimmermann and Visser "South African Law" 4-5, who refer to the doctrinal history of the South 
African private law with reference to publications by several South African writers (especially fn 
19). For an exposition of the relationship between Roman-Dutch and English legal principles, see 
3.2 below. 
3  Examples of legislation predominantly based on Roman-Dutch legal principles are the Deeds 
Registries Act 47 of 1937; Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965; Prescription Act 68 of 1969; 
Expropriation Act 63 of 1975; Game Theft Act 105 of 1991 and Security by Means of Movable 
Property Act 57 of 1993. Examples of legislation predominantly based on English Common Law 
principles are the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936; Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944; Companies Act 
61 of 1973 and 71 of 2008; Land Survey Act 8 of 1997; Banks Act 94 of 1990; National Water Act 
36 of 1998 and Mineral and Petroleum Resources Act 28 of 2002.   
4  Zimmermann "Double Cross" 5; also Zimmermann and Visser "South African Law" 10-12; Hahlo 
and Kahn South African Legal System 131-138. 
5  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter referred to as the Constitution). 
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other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary 
law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill".6 
  
The same is true in the case of other jurisdictions where indigenous law and 
common law are recognised. Canada is also classified as a mixed jurisdiction 
because the Canadian common law is based on English Common Law, European 
civil law (predominantly applied in Quebec) and the customary law of the native 
Indian population, or First Nations.7 Therefore, a comparative study of the 
development and application of South African and Canadian legal principles offers a 
fascinating insight into the mutual influence of the three different components of 
these jurisdictions. 
 
One of the areas of the law where the interaction between the different components 
of the legal system is clearly illustrated is customary or indigenous land tenure. In 
Canadian and South African land tenure the mutual influence of common law (in the 
case of Canada English Common Law property principles and in the case of South 
Africa Roman-Dutch property law principles)8 and customary law principles has 
already been the object of extended litigation.9 The nature of the customary land 
tenure and the protection of right holders were authoritatively settled by the 
Canadian Supreme Court and the South African Constitutional Court and have been 
comprehensively discussed by academic writers.10 
 
                                                          
6  Section 39(3) Constitution; see also Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 469 
(CC) paras 51 and 56. 
7  Slattery "Nature of Aboriginal Title" 11; Henderson, Benson and Findlay Aboriginal Tenure 9; 
Cairns-Way 2009 Ottawa L Rev 9-10.  
8  In South Africa Roman-Dutch principles were mainly applied to private law topics and English 
Common Law principles to public law topics, but this was never a water-tight distinction and is no 
longer strictly applied. In this regard see Hahlo and Kahn South African Legal System 131-138; 
Zimmermann and Visser "South African Law" 4-6. 
9  Cf the Canadian trilogy of cases Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC), an 
appeal from a case heard in the first instance by the Supreme Court of British Columbia 1991 3 
WWR 97 and thereafter heard by the British Columbia Court of Appeal 1993 5 WWR 97, with the 
South African trilogy of cases Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2001 3 SA 1293 (LCC), 
Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) and Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld 
Community 2004 5 SA 469 (CC). 
10  For South Africa, see for instance Hoq 2002 SAJHR 421-443; Ülgen 2002 Journal of African Law 
131-154; Mostert and Fitzpatrick 2004 TSAR 309-323, 498-510; Pienaar 2005 THRHR 533-545, 
2006 1-13; for Canada, see for instance Ülgen 2000 NILR 146-180; Lippert (ed) Beyond the 
Nass Valley; Henderson, Benson and Findlay Aboriginal Tenure.        
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Therefore, the purpose of this paper is not to repeat a description of the nature, 
protection and application of customary land tenure, but to concentrate on the 
methodology used to interpret these rights. As the extent and application of these 
rights are not based on codified or statutory sources11 but stem from customary 
traditions and norms, the normal rules of legal interpretation cannot be followed. This 
paper compares the way in which predominantly westernised courts in Canada and 
South Africa interpret the customary values of land use in order to determine the 
nature of the land tenure rights. 
 
2 Main jurisprudential tendencies of legal analysis 
 
The methodology used to interpret legal principles is based on legal analysis. In both 
the civil law and Common Law systems two main tendencies of theoretical thought 
were developed historically and jurisprudentially, namely legal positivism and natural 
law.12 These two tendencies have influenced the basis of legal analysis in most 
western legal systems to some extent, and in this context also the application of 
indigenous law. 
 
2.1 Legal positivism 
 
The term 'positivism' has many meanings,13 but in the sense of 'legal positivism' it is 
mainly used to denote the analysis of 'the law as it is', in contrast to 'the law as it 
ought to be' (natural law). Although the official beginning of the positivism movement 
is often stated as the start of the nineteenth century,14 its roots are found in the early 
and medieval philosophical theories. The positivistic theories concentrated mainly on 
"overly strict adherence to authority, the intricate web of rules and constructions in 
which all intellectual activity was enmeshed and the exaggerated subtlety of the 
                                                          
11  The existence of customary land tenure is recognised by legislation, though; cf s 35(1) Canadian 
Constitution Act, 1982, and ss 8(1), 39(3) and 211(3) South African Constitution.  
12  There are also other theoretical and jurisprudential tendencies, namely historical and 
anthropological approaches, the economic approach, the sociological approach and modern 
realism. In this regard see Dias Jurisprudence 381-595; Legrand and Munday (eds) Comparative 
Legal Studies 125-128; Glenn Legal Traditions of the World 131-194.     
13  Hart 1958 Harv L Rev 601 n 25.   
14  Dias Jurisprudence 381. 
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trivial distinctions drawn by the schoolmen".15 Legal positivists were (and still are) 
therefore more concerned with applying legal principles rigidly as they appeared and 
were received from the Corpus Juris Civilis, formal precedents,  legislative measures 
and immemorial custom, than with looking into the moral implications of laws and 
legal customs and the discovery of principles of universal validity.16 The founders of 
English positivism, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Austin (1790-1859), 
were characterised by their intellectual love of order, precision and the classification 
of the law as it is. They distinguished between formal analysis, on the one hand, and 
historical and functional analysis on the other hand, both being the sources of the 
law 'as it is'.17  
 
The historical school or Pandectists developed positivism further by concentrating 
mainly on the incorporation of principles from the Corpus Juris Civilis into the 
German legal system. The most famous proponents of this school were Friedrich 
Karl von Savigny (1779-1861) and Bernard Windscheid (1817-1892). They 
endeavoured to deduce a logical and watertight system of general principles from 
Justinian law as they interpreted it.18 Legal positivism was received in South Africa 
mainly through the influence of the Pandectists, who are still regarded by many 
South African lawyers and legal scholars as the true proponents of the classical 
Roman law principles upon which the South African common law is based.19 
 
The most important criticism against legal positivism is that it promotes formalistic 
and rigid legal concepts based on the strict paradigm of law as it is (or is perceived 
to be), without taking moral and social circumstances sufficiently into consideration. 
The way the positivist jurisprudence of Bentham and Austin influenced the Canadian 
                                                          
15  Van der Merwe "Ramus, Mental Habits and Legal Science" 32. 
16  Dias Jurisprudence 544-545; Fuller 1958 Harv L Rev 630-672. 
17  Dias Jurisprudence 382-383; Du Plessis 1961 SALJ 458; Dugard 1971 SALJ 184-185. 
18  Many Pandectist principles are not based on pure Justinian law, but on the integration of these 
principles with German historical customary law; see Johannesburg Municipal Council v Rand 
Townships Registrar 1910 TPD 1314 1319; Van der Walt Ontwikkeling van Houerskap 453-457; 
Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 177-179. 
19  See e.g. Green v Fitzgerald 1914 AD 88; Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 279; Regal v African 
Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1963 1 SA 102 (A). See also Van Blerk Purists' in South African Legal 
Literature 24-36; Dugard "'Purist' Legal Method" 36-37 who both refer to the positivism of 
supporters of the Pandectists and the 'purist' movement in respect of Roman-Dutch law.            
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case law, and the Pandectist positivism of Von Savigny and Windscheid influenced 
South African case law, will be pointed out in 3.1 and 3.2 below respectively. 
 
2.2 Natural law 
 
The main premise of natural law is that law is based not only on the positive law 
created by man, but on law as it ought to be, which is dictated by a natural and 
higher order. This means that moral and social considerations must be taken into 
account in the formulation and application of legal principles. The idea of natural law 
stemmed mainly from Greek and early Roman philosophy and jurisprudence, 
although a deeper or higher legal order was already part of the early Jewish 
tradition.20 In the Greek philosophical tradition Aristotle (384-322 BC) distinguished 
between particular or positive law, and law which is common or natural, emphasising 
the need not only for formal laws but also for just laws moulded in reason.21 During 
pre-classical Roman law (509-27 BC) this idea was further developed by Cicero, who 
was inspired by the dialectical method of Aristotle.22 St Augustine (AD 354-430) was 
one of the first Christian philosophers to contribute to the idea of a divine law 
separate from positive law. The idea of divine law was further developed by the 
Spanish Moral Philosophers23 and Roman-Catholic theologians like St Thomas 
Aquinas (1225-1274), but this was gradually replaced by later legal positivistic views 
which were enforced and practised by most of the universities during the Middle 
Ages.24 In reaction to the mainly positivistic views propagated by most universities, 
Petrus Ramus (1515-1572) a (later) Protestant follower of Jean Calvin, developed 
the 'Ramus method'. His philosophy was characterised by a general and all-
embracing reliance on method in accordance with preconceived rules based on 
reason as the most fundamental aspect of scientific behaviour.25 This view in turn 
influenced Roman-Dutch jurists like Hugo Grotius, Simon van Leeuwen and Ulrich 
                                                          
20  Dias Jurisprudence 555-558.  
21  Dias Jurisprudence 561-563; Van der Merwe "Ramus, Mental Habits and Legal Science" 34-36.  
22  Dias Jurisprudence 563; Van der Merwe "Ramus, Mental Habits and Legal Science" 35. In his 
Topics Aristole distinguished between the demonstrative and dialectical methods of acquiring 
knowledge, with the latter being that branch of scientific theory which reasons from readily 
acceptable opinions and seeks conviction.    
23  Van der Walt Ontwikkeling van Houerskap 258-269.   
24  Van der Merwe "Ramus, Mental Habits and Legal Science" 35-36. 
25  Van der Merwe "Ramus, Mental Habits and Legal Science" 49-56; Van der Walt 2006 
Fundamina 23-24.  
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Huber to methodically rearrange the Justinian civil law in a system dominated by 
axiomatic, self-evident principles based on human reason. Derek van der Merwe26 
states in this regard that sixteenth-century legal humanism, with its incisive textual 
criticism and developed historical sense, had eroded the absolute authority of the 
Roman codes. The Ramist method emphasised a new adherence to natural reason, 
and rejected mere recourse to authority. It appealed to those legal scholars, such as 
Roman-Dutch jurisprudents, who sought to develop a legal system which was based 
on, but not enmeshed within, the Roman tradition. 
 
Natural law is therefore perceived as incorporating universally valid principles which 
are not dependant on human legislative intervention. It does not separate legal and 
moral issues and is a criterion against which any historical law, including Roman law, 
can be tested, although many Roman legal principles were also principles of natural 
law. Therefore, the main contributions of natural law are the emphasis on morality as 
part of a universal, higher legal order that has to be adhered to in a legal system, 
and natural reason without mere recourse to authority. 
 
2.3 Indigenous law 
 
The indigenous law systems of South Africa and Canada are distinctive legal 
systems applied for generations before any colonists settled. These systems have 
since survived meaningful assimilation with the principles of English Common Law 
(Canada) and Roman-Dutch law (South Africa). In both jurisdictions these systems 
have typical characteristics.27  They are unwritten customary law passed on orally 
from generation to generation and have strong ties with culture, tradition and tribal, 
community or family structures.28 The laws are both young and old – the legitimacy 
of custom depends on its age, but the custom is never older than the memory of the 
oldest living person in the family or tribe. There is no distinction between law within a 
                                                          
26  Van der Merwe "Ramus, Mental Habits and Legal Science" 58; see also Van der Walt 2006 
Fundamina 25; Dugard 1983 SALJ 215 indicates that Grotius's emphasis on "the law of nature 
as a dictate of reason". Some modern supporters of Roman-Dutch law in South Africa, the so-
called 'purists', emphasise the formalisation of Roman-Dutch principles to such an extent that 
they lose track of the moral and social implications embodied in natural law. See also fn 19.          
27  Dias Jurisprudence 445-447; Du Plessis Introduction to Law 67-68; Bennett Customary Law 1-7; 
Ülgen 2000 NILR 156-158; Slattery "Nature of Aboriginal Title" 13-17.  
28  Bennett Customary Law 2-4. 
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state structure and law applied between individuals, because there are normally no 
strong governmental and administrative structures of an indigenous nature. 
However, the customs and social practices are accepted as obligatory.29 Typical 
indigenous law in small-scale societies is based mainly on family, communal or tribal 
ties. The rules are fluid according to the circumstances, cannot be classified, and 
may therefore overlap and contradict one another. 
 
Social and moral standards form part of indigenous law in both Canada and South 
Africa.30 Apart from religious customs observed by indigenous communities as part 
of indigenous law, social and moral standards are included into and applied as part 
of the indigenous legal system.31 In most indigenous societies law and religion are 
intertwined. Many of the cultural customs form part of the religion of the family or 
tribe. For example, a society's religious ceremonies are often expressed as their 
spiritual connection with the land they occupy.32 However, in most traditional 
societies there is a phenomenon that can be isolated from religious and other social 
observances for which the term 'law' would be convenient. Legal positivism, 
especially during the 19th and early 20th centuries, eroded this moral fibre of many 
indigenous communities by ignoring the social origins of indigenous law and 
concerning itself mainly with the inner workings of a westernised legal code.33 
Therefore lawyers firstly had to define a set of indigenous rules and then had to 
order them into a consistent system for use by the courts. In this process it was 
irrelevant how the rules were implemented in indigenous societies and whether they 
were morally or politically legitimate to indigenous communities. The application of 
positivism as a legal doctrine resulted in condemning indigenous law to the obscurity 
of a sub-legal order. Indigenous law was therefore often seen as a body of habits, 
conventions and moral standards which could be ignored by policy makers, lawyers 
                                                          
29  Bennett Customary Law 1. Colonial governments developed legal systems to control indigenous 
populations and systems, but these systems were based not on indigenous law but on the 
constitutional and administrative law of the conquerors.   
30  Bennett Customary Law 9. 
31  Dias Jurisprudence 446; Bennett Customary Law 9. Regarding the spiritual connection with land, 
see Henderson Constitutional Framework of Aboriginal Law Tab 7 1 3-4 and 13; also 3.1(a) 
below. 
32  Dias Jurisprudence 446. 
33  See 3.1 and 3.2 below for examples of legal positivism and the non-recognition of indigenous law 
principles.   
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and government officials.34 In 3 below the influence of legal positivism on case law in 
South Africa and Canada will be pointed out. 
 
Indigenous law received constitutional recognition in Canada35 and South Africa36 
and is applied subject to constitutional imperatives. Indigenous law in Canada forms 
part of the Canadian common law, consisting of English Common Law, civil law and 
indigenous law. In South Africa, indigenous law "feeds into, nourishes, fuses with 
and becomes part of the amalgam of South African law".37 
 
3 Interpretation of factual evidence: two case studies  
 
The integration and interpretation of legal principles from different sources are 
regarded as the most complicated aspects of any mixed legal system.38 This is 
illustrated by the way Canadian and South African courts have analysed the 
evidence presented to them in cases regarding the nature and application of 
indigenous land tenure. 
 
3.1 Aboriginal title in Canada 
 
                                                          
34  Bennett Customary Law 9; Lawrence 2001 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 113; 
Cairns-Way 2009 Ottawa L Rev 9-10.   
35  Section 35(1) Constitution Act, 1982. 
36  Sectionss 39(3) and 211(2) Constitution, 1996: "A traditional authority that observes a system of 
customary law may function subject to any applicable legislation and customs, which includes 
amendments to, or repeal of, that legislation or those customs" and s 211(3): "The courts must 
apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation 
that specifically deals with customary law".    
37  Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2001 3 SA 1293 (LCC) para 51. See also para 56: "The 
dangers of looking at indigenous law through a common-law prism are obvious. The two systems 
of law developed in different situations, under different cultures and in response to different 
conditions". See also Lea Property Rights 95-119.  
38  See Dainow (ed) Role of Judicial Decisions; Zimmermann and Visser "South African Law" 2-4; 
Henderson, Benson and Findlay Aboriginal Tenure 9 state: "[R]econciling Aboriginal tenure with 
Crown sovereignty means uncovering a complex history of layered understandings and multiple 
translations that constitute the written and unwritten record of the British common law. Rules of 
evidence alone are inadequate to interpret the history; knowledge of the broader cultural, 
political, economic, religious, and historical context is required".  
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In the Canadian case Delgamuukw v British Columbia39 an area of 58 000 square 
kilometers of British Columbia was claimed by the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en people, 
based on their  ownership (an inalienable fee simple)40 of the territory, which claim 
was subsequently transformed into a claim for aboriginal title over the land.41 The 
Gitksan consist of approximately 4 000 to 5 000 persons, most of whom live in the 
territory claimed, while the Wet'suwet'en consist of approximately 1 500 to 2 000 
persons living predominantly in the territory claimed. The appellants' initial claim was 
based on their historical use and 'ownership' (an inalienable fee simple)42 of one or 
more of the territories. The trial judge held that these territories are marked by 
physical and tangible indicators of their association with the land, like totem poles 
and other distinctive regalia. In addition, the Gitksan Houses have an 'adark', which 
is a collection of sacred oral traditions about their ancestors, histories and territories, 
while the Wet'suwet'en Houses have a 'kanga', which is a collection of spiritual 
songs or dances which ties them to their land. Both of these indicators were 
presented as evidence on behalf of the appellants. The most significant evidence of 
the spiritual connection between the Houses and their territory is a feast hall where 
they tell and retell their stories and identify their territories to remind themselves of 
the sacred connection that they have with their lands.43 British sovereignty over 
British Columbia was established by the Oregon Boundary Treaty of 1846. There 
was consensus among the parties that proof of historic occupation was required to 
establish aboriginal title. The appellants argued that aboriginal title could be proven 
by reference to the pattern of landholdings under aboriginal law, while the 
respondents were of the opinion that title can be proven by the reality of physical 
occupation of the land in question only. 
 
                                                          
39  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC), an appeal from a case heard in first 
instance by the Supreme Court of British Columbia 1991 3 WWR 97 and an appeal heard by the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 1993 5 WWR 97. 
40  McNeil "Aboriginal Title" 57. See also Slattery "Nature of Aboriginal Title" 14: "A person who 
holds a fee simple on land is for all practical purposes the absolute owner of the land. …In 
theory, under the English doctrine of tenures, all lands owned by private individuals are held of 
the Crown, which has the underlying and ultimate title to land. The main practical significance of 
the Crown's ultimate title is that the land reverts to the Crown if the owner dies without leaving an 
heir to the estate". See also 4 below. 
41  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 7. 
42  McNeil "Aboriginal Title" 57. 
43  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) paras 93 and 94; Slattery "Nature of 
Aboriginal Title" 11. Regarding the spiritual connection with land, see Henderson Constitutional 
Framework of Aboriginal Law Tab 7 1 3-4 and 13. 
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The trial judge of the Supreme Court of British Columbia rejected the claims of the 
appellants because three aspects of the evidence presented by the appellants were 
not regarded as sufficient proof of their land tenure rights: 
 
(a) Although their ancestors communally possessed and used the fishing sites 
and adjacent lands for hunting and gathering purposes, the appellants did not 
prove that they had aboriginal title (ownership) over the territory in its entirety, 
because the judge was not persuaded that there was any system of 
governance or uniform custom relating to the land outside the villages. He 
refused to accept that the spiritual beliefs exercised within the territory were 
necessarily common to all of the people or universal practice. 
 
(b) The appellants' claim for jurisdiction over the territories (aboriginal 
sovereignty)44 was rejected because of the sovereignty of the crown at 
common law, as well as the relative paucity of evidence regarding an 
established governance structure and a legal system which is 'a most 
uncertain and highly flexible set of customs which are frequently not followed 
by the Indians themselves' (para 20). 
 
(c) The appellants' further claim for the exercise of aboriginal rights (e.g. hunting, 
fishing and trapping) in the disputed territories was also rejected. The judge 
was convinced that the aboriginal people in the disputed territories had 
continued to exercise these rights even after the establishment of British 
sovereignty, but that the aboriginal rights to land had been extinguished. The 
extinguishment arose out of certain colonial enactments that demonstrated an 
intention to manage crown lands in a way that was inconsistent with 
continuing aboriginal rights. Crown grantees who received land in colonial 
times were clearly intended to receive the land free from any aboriginal 
encumbrances. This intention to extinguish applied not only to land that had 
                                                          
44  This would include the right to enforce existing aboriginal law, as well as to make and enforce 
new laws for the governance of the people and their land. Such a right would also supersede the 
laws of British Columbia if the two were in conflict – Delgamuukw v British Columbia[1997 3 SCR 
1010 (SCC) para 20. 
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actually been granted to third parties, but rather to all crown land in British 
Columbia.45 
 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal subsequently confirmed this judgment46 and 
the appellants appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court 
referred the case back to the trial court for a retrial as a result of the trial court's 
rejection of evidence by the claimants in the form of oral histories and legends, and 
the trial court's inability to approach the rules of evidence and interpret the evidence 
 
… with a consciousness of the special nature of aboriginal claims and the 
evidentiary difficulties in proving a right which originates in times where there were 
no written records of the practices, customs and traditions engaged in. The courts 
must not undervalue the evidence presented by aboriginal claimants simply 
because that evidence does not conform precisely with the evidentiary standards 
that would be applied in, for example, a private law tort case.47 
 
The trial judge held, with reference to St Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co v The 
Queen 1888 14 AC 46,48 that aboriginal title is a personal and usufructuary right that 
cannot be defined in terms of Common Law fee simple. Therefore, it is clear that the 
trial court's methodology of interpreting the evidence was based on the requirements 
to prove Common Law rights and not aboriginal title as practised by the appellants. 
The legal positivist inclination of the Supreme Court of British Columbia and the 
Appeal Court of British Columbia is evident from these judgments. Both judges 
defined aboriginal rights and title in terms of English Common Law principles.49 On 
appeal the Supreme Court of Canada found that subsequent jurisprudence had 
attempted to grapple with this definition, "… and has in the process demonstrated 
that the Privy Council's choice of terminology is not particularly helpful to explain the 
various dimensions of aboriginal title".50 Aboriginal title is therefore defined by the 
                                                          
45  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) paras 23 and 24. 
46  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1993 5 WWR 97. 
47  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 80. 
48  Apparently this personal and usufructuary right simply entailed a bundle of particular rights to 
engage in specific culture-based activities on the land; alternatively the right to exclusive use and 
occupation of the land in order to engage in specific activities. See also Slattery "Nature of 
Aboriginal Title" 14-15. 
49  See 2.1 above. 
50  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 112. The Supreme Court rejected 
the notion that aboriginal title is a mere personal and usufructuary right, as well as the claim that 
it is an inalienable fee simple, and stressed the sui generis nature of aboriginal title as a property 
right. Regarding the sui generis nature of aboriginal title, see McNeil "Aboriginal Title" 58-59 and 
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Supreme Court as a sui generis interest in land, because it does not stem from 
aboriginal customary law, English Common Law or French civil law, but co-ordinates 
the interaction between these systems without forming part of it: 
 
Aboriginal title has been described as sui generis in order to distinguish it from 
'normal' proprietary interests, such as fee simple. However, as I will now develop, it 
is also sui generis in the sense that its characteristics cannot be completely 
explained by reference either to the common law rules of real property or to the 
rules of property found in aboriginal legal systems. As with other aboriginal rights, it 
must be understood by reference to both common law and aboriginal 
perspectives.51 
 
The Supreme Court clearly moved away from the positivistic approach of the two 
preceding courts by defining aboriginal title in accordance with indigenous land 
tenure principles, but subject to the underlying title of the crown. 
 
3.2 Indigenous land tenure in South Africa 
 
The Richtersveld saga52 is based on a land claim which was first instituted in the 
Land Claims Court (LCC),53 where the plaintiffs alleged that they have (i) a right to 
land based on ownership, alternatively (ii) a right based on aboriginal title allowing 
them the exclusive beneficial occupation and use of the land, 54 alternatively (iii) a 
right in land acquired through their beneficial occupation of the land for a period of 
longer than ten years prior to their eventual dispossession.55 The LCC held that the 
Richtersveld community constituted a community for the purposes of the Restitution 
of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, but rejected the land claim on the grounds that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Slattery "Nature of Aboriginal Title" 11-13. See also the authority cited by Slattery "Nature of 
Aboriginal Title" 27 n 1 and Guerin v R 1984 SCR 335 382. 
51  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 112. The Common Law doctrine 
that all Canadian land is subject to the underlying title of the crown is also applicable to aboriginal 
title.  
52  The Richtersveld is a large area of land situated in the north-western region of the Northern Cape 
Province of South Africa bordering Namibia. It has for centuries been inhabited by the 
Richtersveld community. The land claim relates to a narrow strip of land on the western side 
parallel to the Atlantic Ocean (the subject land) which is at present owned by the first defendant, 
Alexkor Ltd, a public company whose sole shareholder is the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa and which has been mining on the subject land for diamonds since 1992. Diamonds 
were discovered in this area during the first half of the twentieth century.   
53  Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2001 3 SA 1293 (LCC). 
54  The specified purposes are habitation, cultural and religious practices, grazing, cultivation, 
hunting, fishing, water trekking and the harvesting and exploitation of natural resources. 
55  Based on s 2 Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994. 
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plaintiffs were dispossessed during 1925 for the purpose of the exploration and 
mining of diamonds, and not because of racially discriminatory legislation or 
practices.56 The Richtersveld community appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal 
(SCA),57 who reversed the judgment of the LCC and found that the Richtersveld 
community had a right akin to common law (Roman-Dutch) ownership which 
constitutes a customary law interest in land as defined in the Act,58 of which they 
were dispossessed in 1925 when diamonds were discovered on the subject land.59 
This dispossession was based on racially discriminatory practices as defined in the 
Act. Thereafter Alexkor Ltd, the defendant, appealed to the Constitutional Court 
(CC)60 and contended that any rights in the subject land which the Richtersveld 
community might have held prior to the annexation of that land by the British Crown 
in 1847 were terminated by reason of such annexation. They contended further that 
the dispossession of the subject land after 19 June 191361 was not the consequence 
of racially discriminatory laws or practices.62 
 
The evidence presented by the Richtersveld people was that the British crown 
acquired the Richtersveld by proclamation on 17 December 1847. The annexation of 
the Richtersveld took place after a process of consultation between the colonial 
government and the recognised political leaders of Little Namaqualand, including the 
leaders of the Richtersveld people. The LCC held that the plaintiffs had no right to 
the claimed land based on ownership, as no indigenous land rights survived the 
annexation, and that the colonial government regarded the Richtersveld as terra 
nullius because the inhabitants were insufficiently civilised (para 37-41). This finding 
was rejected by the SCA (para 35). The SCA first attempted to determine if the 
doctrine of aboriginal title could be incorporated in the South African law by the 
                                                          
56  Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2001 3 SA 1293 (LCC) para 114. 
57  Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA). 
58  In s 1 Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 a right in land is defined as "any right in land 
whether registered or unregistered, and may include the interest of a labour tenant and 
sharecropper, a customary law interest, the interest of a beneficiary under a trust arrangement 
and beneficial occupation for a continuous period of not less than ten years prior to the 
dispossession in question".  
59  Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) para 90-110. 
60  Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 469 (CC). 
61  In terms of s 2(1)(d) and (e) Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 only a dispossession of a 
right in land after 13 June 1913 (the date of promulgation of the Black Land Act 27 of 1913 - the 
first of the apartheid land acts) as a result of racially discriminatory laws or practices gives rise to 
a land claim and such a land claim had to be instituted before 31 December 1998. 
62  Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 469 (CC) para 10. 
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development of the common law in the same way as that in which it was developed 
in other countries with a colonial history.63 The SCA held that aboriginal title is rooted 
in and is the creature of traditional laws and customs (para 36-43). The only 
requirement for the acquisition of aboriginal title is that the indigenous community 
must have had exclusive occupation of the land at the time when the crown acquired 
sovereignty. However, the SCA indicated that there are several hazards associated 
with the recognition of aboriginal title in South African law.   
 
The SCA also rejected the finding of the LCC that the claimed land was terra nullius 
at the time of annexation because the people were insufficiently civilised (para 41).64 
The SCA considered whether the Richtersveld community had a right to land at the 
date of annexation, and whether or not this right survived annexation by the British 
crown. The SCA decided on this aspect:65 
 
During argument in this Court it was conceded on behalf of both respondents66 that 
at the time of annexation the Richtersveld people had a customary law interest 
under their indigenous customary law entitling them to the exclusive occupation and 
use of the subject land and that this interest was akin to the right of ownership held 
under common law.67 In my view, counsel were driven to this concession by the 
uncontested facts.  
 
The legal positivistic inclination of these two courts is evident, as both courts 
hesitated to break with established common law (Roman-Dutch) principles. Although 
the SCA regarded it as unnecessary to consider the recognition of the doctrine of 
aboriginal title, or to consider the development of the common or customary law (as 
a customary law interest in land akin to common law ownership of land by the 
Richtersveld people was recognised), they deemed it necessary to discuss the effect 
of annexation on these rights.68 It was conceded by the respondents that the 
Richtersveld people were sufficiently civilised to refute the notion that the 
                                                          
63  Section 8(3) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 states that a court may apply or 
develop the common law to give effect to any fundamental right protected in the Bill of Rights and 
s 39(2) stipulates that in the interpretation of any legislation, and when developing the common 
law and customary law, every court must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights. S 211(3) Constitution has the same measure regarding customary law.  
64  Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2001 3 SA 1293 (LCC) para 48; Richtersveld Community 
v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) para 25. 
65  Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) para 26. 
66  Alexkor Ltd and the South African Government. 
67  My italics. 
68  Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) para 43-51. 
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Richtersveld, including the subject land, was terra nullius.69 From the evidence it was 
also clear that the colonial government did not regard the Richtersveld as terra 
nullius, as the rights to land of the original inhabitants were recognised by the Dutch 
East India Company during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,70 and the 
British crown during the nineteenth century. Therefore, the indigenous land rights of 
the Richtersveld people were recognised by the Articles of Capitulations when the 
British crown acquired sovereignty during 1806 and were further strengthened by 
Ordinance 50 of 1828.71 The SCA held that the Richtersveld was not uninhabited 
and not amenable to acquisition by occupation or settlement and concluded that the 
existing customary law interest in the subject land held by the Richtersveld people 
survived British annexation.72 But it was still held in the final instance that the right to 
occupy the claimed land is a right akin to the right of ownership held under common 
law. 
 
On appeal the Constitutional Court (CC) confirmed the finding of the SCA that the 
Richtersveld community held a customary law interest in the subject land within the 
definition of 'a right in land' in the Restitution Act.73 However, the CC did not agree 
with the description of the substantive content of the interest as "…a right to 
exclusive beneficial occupation and use, akin to the right of ownership held under 
common law".74 The nature and content of the rights of the Richtersveld community 
to the claimed land must be determined by reference to indigenous law, and not the 
common law.75 It was proven by the evidence that the Richtersveld people's right to 
the land survived annexation and therefore the nature and content of their right had 
to be determined according to their indigenous law and custom until the date of their 
dispossession. In this regard the CC cautioned:76 
                                                          
69  Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) para 46-47. 
70  Bennet "African Land - A History of Dispossession" 66. 
71  Section 3 Ordinance 50 of 1828. 
72  Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) para 61. 
73  Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 469 (CC) para 48. 
74  Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) para 29. 
75  With reference to the decision of the Privy Council in Oyekan v Adele 1957 2 All ER 785 (PC) at 
788G-H, where it was held that a dispute between indigenous people as to the right to occupy a 
piece of land has to be determined according to indigenous law "without importing English 
conceptions of property law". 
76  Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 469 (CC) para 51. See also para 56: "The 
dangers of looking at indigenous law through a common-law prism are obvious. The two systems 
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While in the past indigenous law was seen through the common law lens, it must 
now be seen as an integral part of our law. Like all law it depends for its ultimate 
force and validity on the Constitution. Its validity must now be determined by 
reference not to common law, but to the Constitution. The courts are obliged by s 
211(3) of the Constitution to apply customary law when it is applicable, subject to 
the Constitution and any legislation that deals with customary law. … It is clear, 
therefore, that the Constitution acknowledges the originality and distinctiveness of 
indigenous law as an independent source of norms within the legal system. At the 
same time the Constitution, while giving force to indigenous law, makes it clear that 
such law is subject to the Constitution and has to be interpreted in the light of its 
values. Furthermore, like the common law, indigenous law is subject to any 
legislation, consistent with the Constitution, that specifically deals with it. In the 
result, indigenous law feeds into, nourishes, fuses with and becomes part of the 
amalgam of South African law. 
 
While the SCA's methodology to interpret the evidence was based on their 
endeavour to keep as close as possible to (Roman-Dutch) common law principles, 
the CC recognised the peculiar characteristics of indigenous law as part of the South 
African law, which is to be applied subject to constitutional principles and not 
common law principles.  
 
4 The methodology used to interpret evidence 
 
The methodology used to interpret evidence in respect of indigenous land tenure 
was prescribed by both the Canadian Supreme Court and the South African 
Constitutional Court. In the Delgamuukw case the Supreme Court laid down the 
following evidentiary principles in the light of the peculiar nature of aboriginal title: 
 
(a) Evidence in respect of aboriginal title differs from evidence in respect of 
aboriginal rights. Aboriginal rights are defined in terms of activities (e.g. 
hunting, trapping and fishing).77 To be acknowledged as an aboriginal right 
such activity must be an element of the practice, custom or tradition integral to 
the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming the right. However, 
aboriginal title, as a species of aboriginal rights, is a right to the land itself. 
Subject to the inherent limitations of aboriginal title, the land may be used for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of law developed in different situations, under different cultures and in response to different 
conditions". 
77  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 140; see also R v Van der Peet 
1996 2 SCR 507 para 74. 
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a variety of activities, none of which need to be individually protected as 
aboriginal rights under section 35(1) of the Canadian Constitution Act (e.g. the 
exercise of mineral rights). Those activities are parasitic on the underlying 
aboriginal title.78 The purpose of section 35(1) is to reconcile the prior 
presence of aboriginal peoples with the assertion of crown sovereignty. The 
requirement of prior presence can only be satisfied by proof of two aspects: 
 
(i) the occupation of the land; and  
(ii) the prior social organisation and distinctive cultures of aboriginal 
peoples on that land.79 
 
(b) The onus to prove aboriginal title rests on the aboriginal group claiming such 
title. The Supreme Court has laid out the analytical framework for 
constitutional claims under section 35(1).80 The court must determine: 
 
(i) whether the aboriginal claimant was acting pursuant to an aboriginal title 
(onus to prove rests on the aboriginal group); 
(ii) whether that title has been extinguished (onus to prove rests on the 
crown); 
(iii) if not extinguished, whether the title has been infringed (onus to prove 
rests on the aboriginal group); 
(iv) whether the infringement is justified (onus to prove rests on the crown). 
 
In order to establish aboriginal title ((b)(i) above), the following must be proven by the 
aboriginal group: 
 
(aa) The land must be occupied prior to sovereignty. 
 
                                                          
78  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 140; see also R v Van der Peet 
1996 2 SCR 507 para 74. 
79  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 141; R v Van der Peet 1996 2 
SCR 507 para 74. Prior to the Delgamuukw case the second aspect had been given more 
emphasis, as the types of cases which had come before the Supreme Court often concerned 
regulatory offences that proscribed discrete types of activity. See also Henderson Constitutional 
Framework of Aboriginal Law 3-4. 
80  See R v Bernard 2003 4 CNLR para 19 for a complete list of authority in this regard. 
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While the requirement for the establishment of aboriginal rights in general is based 
on the activities exercised at the time of first contact with the settlers,81 the 
requirement for the establishment of aboriginal title is the occupation of the disputed 
lands at the time the crown asserted sovereignty over the land.82 Therefore the time 
period in the case of aboriginal title differs from aboriginal rights in general. This time 
period is important, as aboriginal title is based not only on prior occupation before 
sovereignty, but also on the relationship between the common law and pre-existing 
systems of aboriginal law. In terms of common law principles the crown owns all land 
from the time when it asserted sovereignty, but aboriginal title is a burden on the 
crown's underlying title.83 Because it does not make sense to speak of a burden on 
the underlying title before that title existed, aboriginal title was established 
('crystallised') at the time sovereignty was asserted. 
 
Physical occupation may be established by the construction of dwellings, the 
cultivation and enclosure of fields, the regular use of tracts of land for hunting and 
fishing, or the exploitation of its resources. The group's size, way of life, material 
resources and technological abilities, as well as the character of the disputed lands, 
should also be taken into consideration. A claim to aboriginal title could also be 
made when a group could demonstrate that their connection with a piece of land was 
of central significance to their distinctive culture, although the judge was not 
prepared to explicitly include this element as one of the tests for aboriginal title, as 
"..it would seem clear that any land that was occupied pre-sovereignty, and which 
                                                          
81  R v Van der Peet 1996 2 SCR 507 para 60: "(T)he time period that a court should consider in 
identifying whether the right claimed meets the standard of being integral to the aboriginal 
community claiming the right is the period prior to contact". [My emphasis] In the case of the 
proof of aboriginal rights the emphasis is mainly on the exercise of culture-specific activities prior 
to the arrival of Europeans. Practices, customs and traditions that arose solely as a response to 
European influences do not meet the standard for recognition as aboriginal rights – Delgamuukw 
v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 144. See also Henderson Constitutional 
Framework of Aboriginal Law 4-7. 
82  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) paras 142 and 145. 
83  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) paras 145; see also Slattery "Nature of 
Aboriginal Title" 13. The crown after sovereignty gained ultimate title to lands held by aboriginal 
people, after which the aboriginal group held a communal title at common law that formed a 
burden on the crown's ultimate title. See also Slattery 1987 Can Bar Rev 742; McNeil Common 
Law Aboriginal Title 196. 
G PIENAAR                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)3 
171 / 183 
 
the parties maintained a substantial connection with since then, is sufficiently 
important to be of central significance to the culture of the claimants".84 
 
(bb) There must be continuity between present and pre-sovereignty occupation. 
 
As conclusive evidence of pre-sovereignty occupation is often difficult to obtain, an 
aboriginal community may provide evidence of present occupation as proof of pre-
sovereignty occupation. In addition to this, it is required that continuity between 
present and pre-sovereignty occupation exists, because the relevant time for the 
determination of aboriginal title is at the time before sovereignty. There is no need to 
establish an unbroken chain of continuity, because the occupation and use of lands 
may have been disrupted for a time, often as a result of the unwillingness of 
colonisers to recognise aboriginal title. To impose the requirement of continuity too 
strictly might undermine the very purpose of section 35(1) by perpetuating the 
historical injustice suffered by aboriginal peoples at the hand of colonisers who failed 
to respect aboriginal rights to land.85 Therefore the requirement should be a 
substantial maintenance of the connection between the people and the land. There 
is also a strong possibility that the precise nature of occupation will have changed 
between the time of sovereignty and the present. Normally such a change would not 
preclude a claim for aboriginal title, as long as a substantial connection between the 
people and the land has been maintained.86 The only limit to this might be the 
internal limitation on the use of aboriginal land, which is inconsistent with the 
continued use by future generations of aboriginals.87 
 
(cc) Occupation must have been exclusive at sovereignty. 
 
This requirement flows from the definition of aboriginal title as the exclusive use and 
occupation of land.88 The exclusivity vests in the aboriginal community which holds 
                                                          
84  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 149-151; see also R v Adams 
1996]3 SCR 101 para 26. 
85  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 153; see also R v Côté 1996 3 
SCR 139 para 53 and a reference to Mabo v Queensland 1992 107 ALR 1. 
86  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 154. 
87  See in this regard 3 above. 
88  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) paras 118 and 155. 
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the ability to exclude others from the lands held pursuant to that title.89 As in the case 
of the proof of occupation, the proof of exclusivity must place equal weight on the 
aboriginal perspective and the common law perspective. Common law relies heavily 
on the exclusivity derived from the notion of fee simple ownership as held by 
Europeans, and should be used in the concept of aboriginal title with caution. 
Therefore, the test required to establish exclusive occupation must take into account 
the context of the aboriginal society at the time of sovereignty. Exclusive occupation 
can be proven even if other aboriginal groups were present or frequented the 
disputed lands. Under those circumstances exclusivity would be demonstrated by 
the intention and capacity to retain exclusive control.90 Thus an isolated act of 
trespass would not undermine the exclusivity of the occupation, if an aboriginal 
community intended to and attempted to enforce their exclusive occupation. Where 
outsiders were allowed access upon request, the fact that they asked for permission 
would be evidence of the community's exclusive control. 
 
To the same extent trespass by other aboriginal groups or communities does not 
necessarily refute a claim for aboriginal title, as an aboriginal community may have 
trespass laws which are proof of their intention to maintain exclusive occupation, or 
their granting of permission to other groups or communities may be used as proof of 
their exclusive control.91 In the event of a lack of proof of exclusive occupation, an 
aboriginal community or person who proves occupation together with other 
communities may establish an aboriginal right to use the land in question. This is an 
aboriginal right short of title. Such rights might be intimately tied to the land and 
might permit a number of site-specific activities, but they are not rights to the land 
itself, and can therefore not be acknowledged as aboriginal title. 
 
In order to prove the indigenous land tenure of the Richtersveld people in the 
Richtersveld case, the SCA analysed the evidence of experts regarding the nature of 
their rights prior to annexation (para 13-22); at annexation (para 23-29) and after 
annexation (para 30-51). From the evidence, which was not contested in either the 
                                                          
89  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 155. 
90  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 156; see also McNeil Common 
Law Aboriginal Title 204. 
91  Delgamuukw v British Columbia 1997 3 SCR 1010 (SCC) para 158. 
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LCC or the SCA, it was clear that before annexation the Richtersveld people shared 
the same culture, including the same language, religion, social and political 
structures, customs and lifestyle. One of the components of the culture of the 
Richtersveld people was the customary rules relating to their entitlement to and use 
and occupation of the land. The land belonged to all of the members of the 
Richtersveld community, who were entitled to the reasonable occupation and use of 
the land and its resources. All of the members of the community had a sense of 
legitimate access to the communal land to the exclusion of all other people. Non-
members had to obtain permission to use the land, for which they sometimes had to 
pay. The Richtersveld community also had rules related to criminal and civil law such 
as the prohibition of adultery, assault and theft, the recognition of private property 
rights of movables, rules of inheritance and the obligation to pay compensation for 
damage to private property. The SCA came to the conclusion that at the time of 
annexation the Richtersveld community had for a long time enjoyed exclusive 
beneficial occupation of the whole of the Richtersveld (including the claimed land) in 
the course of their semi-nomadic existence. The rules and decisions of their political 
structure (raad) were recognised by both the indigenous inhabitants and others, like 
missionaries and traders. With reference to Canadian sources especially, the SCA 
held that occupation of the land has to be determined according to the following 
requirements (para 23-25): 
 
 Uninterrupted presence on and use of the land at the time of annexation. This 
requirement need not amount to possession at common law. 
 
 A nomadic lifestyle is not inconsistent with the exclusive and effective right of 
occupation of land by indigenous people. Although the Richtersveld people's 
use of the land may have been only seasonal, and may have been sparse 
and intermittent, that did not mean that they did not have exclusive beneficial 
occupation of the land, which other people respected. 
 
Although the SCA regarded it unnecessary to consider the recognition of the doctrine 
of aboriginal title or to consider the development of the common or customary law, 
as a customary law interest in land akin to common law ownership of land by the 
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Richtersveld people was already recognised, they deemed it necessary to discuss 
the effect of annexation on these rights.92 According to international law, the 
establishment of sovereignty over new territory could be effected by conquest or 
cession if the territory was inhabited, or by occupation if it was uninhabited.93 
Occupation of inhabited territory was based on the fiction that if a territory was 
inhabited by people regarded as insufficiently civilised, it could be acquired by 
occupation as if it were uninhabited and therefore terra nullius. It is clear from the 
uncontested evidence of the expert witnesses that the Richtersveld people had a 
social and political organisation, including a civil and criminal legal system based on 
traditional laws and customs, at the time of the annexation. It was also conceded by 
the respondents that the Richtersveld people were sufficiently civilised to refute the 
notion that the Richtersveld, including the claimed land, was terra nullius.94 From the 
evidence it was also clear that the colonial government did not regard the 
Richtersveld as terra nullius, as the rights to land of the original inhabitants were 
recognised by the Dutch East India Company during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries,95 and the British crown during the nineteenth century. The indigenous land 
rights of the Richtersveld people were recognised by the Articles of Capitulation 
when the British crown acquired sovereignty during 1806. It was further strengthened 
by Ordinance 50 of 1828.96 Therefore, the SCA found that the Richtersveld was not 
uninhabited and not amenable to acquisition by occupation or settlement. The 
indigenous inhabitants were also sufficiently civilised to refute the notion of 
occupation of terra nullius (para 52). Thus the territory was obtained by 
proclamation. The SCA compared the doctrine of recognition (which entails that 
annexation of the land by the British crown resulted in the abolition of all pre-existing 
customary rights and interests except those rights explicitly recognised by the crown) 
with the doctrine of continuity (that there is a presumption that a mere change in 
sovereignty does not extinguish the private and customary property rights of the 
inhabitants of the conquered territory, unless confiscated by an act of state).97 After 
                                                          
92  Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) paras 43-51. 
93  See text at n 70 above. See also Henderson, Benson and Findlay Aboriginal Tenure 284-300.  
94  Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) paras 46-47. 
95  Bennett "African Land – A History of Dispossession" 66-67. 
96  Section 3 Ordinance 50 of 1828. 
97  Bennett & Powell 1999 SAJHR 480. See also Mabo v The State of Queensland (No 2) 1992 175 
CLR 57: "The preferable rule, supported by the authorities cited, is that a mere change in 
sovereignty does not extinguish native title to land. (The term "native title" conveniently describes 
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analysing the international precedent on this matter, the SCA accepted the doctrine 
of continuance and concluded that the existing customary law interest in the subject 
land held by the Richtersveld people survived British annexation.98 
 
The content of the customary law interest in land also encompasses a right to 
minerals and other natural resources.99 The SCA especially relied on the evidence 
that the Richtersveld people had mined and used copper for the purpose of 
adornment long before annexation and that they appreciated the value of minerals. 
They had even granted mineral leases to outsiders as early as 1856. The evidence 
clearly established that the Richtersveld community believed that they had the right 
to minerals and that they had acted in a manner consistent with such a belief. The 
minerals had been exploited without requesting permission from anyone to do so, 
and strangers and non-inhabitants respected their rights by obtaining their 
permission to prospect for minerals, and even concluding mineral leases with them. 
Although there was no proof of mining activities by the Richtersveld community on 
the subject land itself, it was clear from the evidence that at the time of annexation 
the mining for and use of minerals was part of the distinctive culture of the 
Richtersveld people,100 who appropriated for themselves the right to minerals and 
natural resources on the land, and that this custom had been continued from earlier 
days. 
 
The CC confirmed the finding of the SCA that the Richtersveld community held a 
customary law interest in the subject land within the definition of 'a right in land' in the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act.101 However, the CC did not agree with the description 
of the substantive content of the interest as "…a right to exclusive beneficial 
occupation and use, akin to that held under common-law ownership".102 The nature 
and content of the rights of the Richtersveld community to the subject land was to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the interests an the rights of indigenous inhabitants in land, whether communal, group or 
individual, possessed under traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs 
observed by the indigenous inhabitants).The preferable rule equates the indigenous inhabitants 
of a settled colony to the rights and interests recognised by the Privy Council in In re Southern 
Rhodesia as surviving to the benefit of the residents of a conquered colony". 
98  Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) para 61. 
99  Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) paras 85-89. 
100  With reference to R v Van der Peet 1996 SCR 289 para 60. 
101  Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 469 (CC) para 48. 
102  Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 6 SA 104 (SCA) para 29. 
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determined by reference to indigenous law, and not the common law.103 It was 
proven by the evidence that the Richtersveld people's right to the claimed land 
survived annexation104 and therefore the nature and content of their right had to be 
determined according to their indigenous law and custom up to the date of their 
dispossession. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
Although the lower courts in Canada and South Africa clearly demonstrated their 
positivistic preference to adhere to the established land tenure structures of Anglo-
American Common Law and Roman-Dutch law respectively, it is commendable that 
the Supreme Court of Canada and the Constitutional Court of South Africa have 
recognised the peculiar/special nature of indigenous land tenure in the form of 
aboriginal title and indigenous ownership. The fact that the moral and spiritual nature 
of indigenous land tenure is recognised constitutionally is an exciting development in 
both jurisdictions. 
 
The fact that specific requirements have to be met to prove indigenous land tenure 
precludes the positivistic adherence to established common law principles. The 
characteristics of indigenous land tenure differ to such an extent from westernised 
legal concepts in respect of land tenure that indigenous land tenure cannot be 
described in terms of the established common law terminology as 'a right akin to 
Roman-Dutch ownership' or 'a personal and fiduciary right'. This necessitates that 
special evidence in concurrence with the characteristics of indigenous land tenure is 
needed to prove indigenous people's land tenure rights. 
                                                          
103  With reference to the decision of the Privy Council in Oyekan v Adele 1957 2 All ER 785 (PC) at 
788G-H, where it was held that a dispute between indigenous people as to the right to occupy a 
piece of land has to be determined according to indigenous law "without importing English 
conceptions of property law". 
104  See 3.2 above. 
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